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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah
RAY PHEBUS, JOE T. JUHAN, and
~\SHLEY Y ALLEY OIL C0l\1P ANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiffs and
Petitioners

Case No.

VS.

"\Y~I.

ST~\XLEY

DUNFORD, Judge of
the District Court, Uintah County, and
N. J. ~\IE_\GHER,

7187

Def,enifunts and
Respondents

PETITIONERS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an original mandamus proceeding to compel
the trial judge to conform to the mandate of this court
after appeal and the issuance of the remittitur. The
judgment appealed from quieted title to real property
against the appealing defendants, including Ray Phebus,
one of the plaintiffs and petitione~s herein, assessing
costs against them and restraining them and those claiming or to claim by, through or under any of them from
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going into possession of the property or asserting any
adverse claim thereto. Upon the appeal this court reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the
case to that court for proceedings to conform to the
opinion.
Ray Phebus, one of the appeUants from the judgment that was revers·ed, seeks by this proceeding to have
the judgment appealed from formally vacated of record
and to be restored of record to the position that he was
in prior to the entry of the erroneous judgment. Joe T.
Juhan and kshley Valley Oil Company are interested
parties and were co-defendants and appellants with Ray
Phebus in the appear which resulted in the reversal. As
to them, the trial court vacated of record the judgment
appealed from, but, as interested parties, they join as
plaintiffs and petitioners.
There is no controverted issue of fact herein. The
facts, as set forth in the petition for an alternative writ
of mandamus, as adrnited by the return or answer on
file herein, can be briefly summarized as follows.:
Honorable Wm. Stanley Dunford was the trial
judge in the action commenced on December 5th, 1944
in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in
and for Uintah County, Utah, wherein N. J. Meagher,
one of the defendants. and respondents herein, is plaintiff
and your petitioners together with others are defendants, and which action was brought to quiet title to certain lands situate in Uintah County, Utah; that judgment was entered in said action in favor of the plain1.
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3
tiff Meagher on or about April 15th, 1946, quieting ptaintiff's title to said real property and adjudging, among
other things, the following:
(a) 'That all adverse claims of the defendants, including petitioners herein, in the lands above described
or any part thereof and all persons claiming or attempting to claim any interest therein by, through or under
the said defendants, or any of them, were invalid and
groundless.
(h) That an oil and gas ·lease of June 4th, 1924 and
a :Modification Agreement of May 21, 1927 were invalid
and of no force and effect and cancelled.
(c) That the said Meagher was the true and lawful owner of all rights, titles and interests in the lands
above described, e:x:cept for a right of way and royalty
interests in said decree specified.
(d) That the title to said lands be quieted against
all claims or demands or pretensions of the said defendants or any of them, and that the said defendants, and
each of them, including the petitioners herein, be perpetually enjoined from asserting any claim to said lands
or any part thereof.
(e) That the said Meagher have judgment against
the defendants, Ray Phebus, Joe T. Juhan and Ashley
Valley Oil Company, petitioners herein, for costs and
disbursements amounting to the sum of $32.30.
2. That following the entry of said judgment your
petitioners, Ray Phebus, Joe T. Juhan and Ashley
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Valley Oil Company duly appealed to this court, the
appeal being known as case number 6972, and on the 27th
day of October, 1947 this court rendered its opinion on
said appeal, by which the decision of the lower court was
reversed and the case remanded to that court for proceedings to conform to the opinion, the decision being
report'ed in the case of Me,agher v. Uintah Gas Co. et
al, 185 Pac. 2d 747; that 'the remittitur thereon was filed
with the Clerk of the District Court of Uintah County,
Utah on the 18th day of March, 1948.
3. That on the 23rd day of Aprii, 1948 in open court
at Yernal, Uintah County, Utah, before 'the District Court
of said county, Honorable Wm. Stanley Dunford, one of
the defendants and respondents herein, presiding, your
petitoners moved the court for an order vacating and
setting aside the judgment and decree of said court pursuant to the decision and mandate of this court in its
case number 6972; that the motion was granted as to
the petitioners Joe T. Juhan and Ashley Valley Oil Company, hut that the trial court failed, refused 'and neglected and still does fail, refus·e and neglect to set
aside and vacate said judgment and decree as to Ray
Phebus. In this connection it is alleged that the trial
court wholly ignored and failed to follow and abide by
the mandate and decision of this court aforesaid, hut the
defendants and respondents, by their answer herein,
assert in effect, by denial, that the trial court in granting the motion as to Joe T. Juhan and A:shley V'alley
Oil Company and refusing to grant it as to Ray Phebus
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did not ignore or fail to follow or abide by said mandate and decision.
-!. That notwithstanding the mandate and decision
of this court on the appeal in the aforesaid action, the
trial judge, in refusing to set aside and vacate the
judgment and decree appealed from as to yourlpetitioner,
Ray Phebus, holds and asserts the former judgment and
decree to be valid and effective as against the said Ray
Phebus and does thereby prejudice the rights and interests of petitioners, Joe T. Juhan and Ashley V ailey
Oil Company in and to said lands. As to this, the de.
fendants and respondents, ·by their answer, deny that in
the refusal to set aside and vacate the judgment and de.
cree appealed from as to Ray Phebus, the rights and interests of Joe T. Juhan and Ashley Valley Oil Company
have been or are in anyway prejudiced.

5. It is alleged that plaintiffs and petitioners have
no plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law and that it is the duty of the defendant,
Wm. Stanley Dunford, as such District Judge, to forthwith vacate and set aside the judgment and decr·ee appealed from as against all of the defendants in said
action and, particularly, the defendant Ray Phebus, one
of the petitioners herein. These allegations, by the answer of the defendants and respondents, are denied.
6. The defendants and respondents affirmatively
allege that the petitioners have a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law hy pres~ent
ing to the defendant judge their propos·ed Findings of
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Fact, Conclusions and Decree, which they have so far
not done; that the order entered by the trial judge on
May 4th, 1948, following the motion of April 23rd, 1948
by which the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree in so far as the same affect the rights of Ashley
Valley Oil Company and Joe T. Juhan were vacated
and set aside, omitting Ray Phebus therefrom, was in
all respects in conformity with the decision of this court.
'The judgment in the action appea~ed from was
against all three of the plaintiffs and petitioners herein
and all three joined in the appeal. The reversal of th'e
judgment affected all three of the appealing defendants
alike, but, that, notwithstanding the trial judge in refusing to vacate the judgment against Ray Phebus in
effect holds, and by necessary implication does hold, the
title of Meagher, the prevailing party in the judgment
aJppea:led from, to he quieted as against Phebus and all
claiming or to claim by, through or under him in and to
the real property affected by said decree, the restraining order to be in effect as against him and all claiming
by, through or under him, and in full force and effect
as to costs awarded against Phebus in the trial of the
action and upon which execution might issue. The effect
of the order continues the judgment lien for costs as
against all real property that Phebus might have in said
county or ~elsewhere where the judgment might be
docketed. This court is now asked to order th·e trial judge
to vacate of record its judgment subs·equent1y reversed
as to all of the appealing parties and, particularly, petitioner Ray Phebus.
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ARGUMENT
Upon the filing of the remittitur after appeal, the
defendant judge was asked to forma:lly remove, by declaring it to be a nullity, the 'encumbrance of record of
its judg~nent which this court held to be without substance. The duty of the defendant judge in that particular
and the reasons and points and authorities to support
the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this action
prayed for, involve a consideration of the following:
1. Effect of Reversal on Appeal and Remand Without
Specific Instructions.

The opinion of this court in l\1eagher v. Uintah Gas
Co., et al, case number 6972, and which for conv·enience
will be hereinafter referred to ~by the caS'e number, contains the following language: ., 'The decision of the lower
court is reversed, and the case remanded to that court
for proceedings to conform to this opinion. Costs to
appellants." The effect of the reversal with directions
to proceed in conformity with the views expressed in the
opinion fHed puts the case in the same position in the
court below as if no decree had ever been entered. In
the case of Larsen v. Gasb,erg, 43 Utah 203, 134 Pac. 885,
this court held:

"The rule is well settled that, where a j1.~dg
ment is reV!Brsed and a new trial grant.ed without
any specific instruct~ons or directions, the case
stands in the lower court precisely ,as it did b~efore
a trial was had in the first instance. 'The general
rule in thiis regard is well stated in 3 Ency. L. &
P. 579, in the following language: 'When a decree

'
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is reversed and the cause remanded without specific directions, the decision of the court below
is ~entire'ly abrogated, and the cause then stands in
the court below precisely as if no trial had occurred, and that court h'as the same power over the
record as it had before its decree was rendered,
and it may permit amendments to the 1prleadings to
the same extent that it might have done before the
trial, and in the exercise of the same discretion,
except that it is concluded by the legal principles
announced by the appell'ate court. And where a
cause is reversed and remanded with directions to
proceed in conformity with the views expressed
in the opmion filed, and it appears from such
opinion that the grounds of reversal are of a
character which may be obviated by subsequent
amendments of the pleadings or the introduction
of additional evidence, it is the duty of the trial
'Court to permit the cause to be redocketed and to
permit amendments to be made and evidence introduced on the hearing just as though it was then
being heard for the first time.' The doctrine is
tersely, and we think correctly, stated in 1 Ency.
Pl. & Pr. 618, as follows: 'Where the appellate
court reverses a judgment and remands the cause
generally without any specific directions, amendments to the pleadings may be allowed upon the
reinstatement of the case in the court below as
if it had never been tried, although the appellate
court may have adjudged the pleadings insufficient on demurrer.' Of course, as stated on page
620 of the same work, 'a 'party should not he allowed to amend so as to reopen questions which
have been adjudicated hy the appellate court.' ''
(Italics ours).
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To the same effect is the expression of this court
in the case of TV,arren v. Robis1ovn, 21 Utah 429, 61 Pac.
28:
''It will be noticed that the case was not 'reversed and remanded,' but simply 'remanded,'
with directions to 'proceed'; that is, 1sent hack to
the court below to proceed, the same as if no
judgment of nonsuit had heen entered, according
to the rules of law announced in the opinion as
governing the case. * * * In Hawkins v. Railway
Co., 39 C.C.A. 538, 99 Fed. 322, ~as appears from
the syllabus, it was held: 'When a decree is reversed, and the mandate doe s not direct the entry
of any particular decree, hut only th3it further
proceeding be had not inconsistent with the opinion of the appellate court, the effect is to put the
case in the same position in the court below as if
no decree had ever been entered, and the court
has the same authority to permit amendments of
the pleadings to enlarge the issues, and admit
further proofs, a s it had before the entry of the
decree.' Nelson v. Hubbard, 13 Ark. 2'53; Woolman v. Garringer, 3 Mont. 405; Commissioners
v. Carey, 1 Ohio St. 463; West v. Brashear, 14
Pet. 51, 10 L. Ed. 350; Supervisors v. Kennicott,
94 U. S. 498, 24 L. Ed. 260; In re Banford Fork
& Tool Co., 160 U. S. 247, 16 Sup. Ct. 291, 40 L.
Ed. 414; Ex parte Sibbald, 12 Pet. 4&8, 9 L. Ed.
1167. And, where an a'Ppeal is taken from a judgment of an inferior court entered under a mandate
of the appellate court, the latter tribunal will
construe its own mandate in connection with its
opinion, to determine whether the inferior court
proceeded in accordance therewith. Gaines v.
Rugg, 148 U. S. 228, 13 Sup. Ct. 611, 37 L. Ed.
432; In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., supra.''
1

1
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The general rule is stated in HOI!}ne New Trw 'OI1Itd
Appeal, Vol. 2, Sec. 299, pp. 1722-1723, as follows :
''The reversal of the judgment leaves the
litigation in the situation it was in prior to entry
thereof. The parties are in the same position as if
no judgment had been rendered. 'When the order
... was reversed, it no longer had any vitality or
force, and the result was to leave the proceeding
where it stood before that order was made.' When
a decree. is reversed, it is vacated, and the matter
stands 'as though no decree had ever been made.'
'When the order of the supreme court in the case
of L·ondon etc. Bank v. Bandma.nn, 120 Cal. 220,
was made, reversing the judgment of the court
below, that judgment was forthwith vacated, and
until action was taken by the court below in pursuance of the mandate to enter another judgment
in accordance with the opinion of the supreme
court, tihere was no judgment in ·existence in the
case.'
''Nor is the effect essentially otherwise even
though the judgment of reversal may be accompanied with modifying words. In ·the case of Cowdery v. London etc Bank, already cited in this
connection, it was held that the legal effect of a
reversal of the judgment with directions to enter
judgment in accordance with the view expressed
is to vacate the decree so reversed, and leave it
as if it had never been rendered, although the
mandate is in form a modification, ~and the trial
court has received no specific directions as to the
particular form of modified decree authorized. It
was further said that the appellate court might
have modified ~the decree, but, as it did not, no
vitality is left therein for any purpose, and a new
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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decree n1ust be entered. The case stands as an
action pending with final judgment remaining to
be entered." (Italics ours)
To the same effect is Bancroft's Oode Practice awd
Remedies, Yol. ~l, Sec. 7403, pp. 9734-9735:
''The effect of an unqualified reversal of a
judgement is to vacate the judgment and render
it without vitality or force. The proceeding is left
where it stood before the judgment or order was
made, and the parties stand in the same position
as if no judgment or order had ever been rendered
or made, with the exception that the opinion of
the court on appeal must be followed so far, as
applicable. If the cause is reversed for a new trial
or for further proceedings in the lower court,
a mandate is usually required, but thi s is a matter
which is treated in another chapter.''
·
1

The expression used in Hayne New Trial and Appeal,
supra, where the author quotes from London etc. Bl(Jtnk
v. Bandmamn, 120 Cal. 220, to the ·effect that the order
of the Supreme Court reversing the judgment of the court
below "forthwith vacated" the former judgment is the
closest expression that we have found to the effect that
the decision of the Supreme Court is self-executing. There
is no specific provision in our Code, so far as we can
determine, relating to the mechanics of removing frorn
the record the cloud of the erroneous and reversed judgment in a suit where titl~e to real property is involved,
unless it can be said that the decision of this court automatically, and without more, accomplishes complete restitution in that regard.
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By the rule stated in the foregoing authorities, it
might he said that the motion made before the trial court
to vacat·e and set aside its erroneous judgment and decree was unnecessary, but befo~e coming to that conclusion, the practical aspoots of the situation should be
born in mind. In the first place, the judgment and decree
appealed from restrained the defendants from going
into possession of the pro;perty involved and from asserting any adverse claim thereto. Orderly procedure and
due respect for the decree of a court of general jurisdiction would seem to us to encourage a formal motion
to vacat·e. Furthermore, the judgment for costs, having
been entered in a judgment docket and hecoming a lien
attaching its-elf to all of the real property of the judgment debtor, would immediately confront the examiner
of the title to any real property in the name of the
judgment debtor. The examiner would not necessarily
know from an inspection of the judgment docket that
the judgment of the trial court had been reversed. It is
conceivable that the examiner of the record might in
good faith require something more than a reference to
expressions of the court in other cases to determine that
the judgment had been vacated and s•et aside by a reversal. Good practice, it seems to us, would warrant the
motion to vacate so as to remove all doubt but that the
successful arprpealing de£endant was reinstated to the
same position that he was in prior to the entry of the
erroneous judgment. The petitioners herein, by their
motions to vacate the •erroneous judgment, pursued a
practice recognized as proper under the circumstances.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
2.

It is the Duty ofl the Trial ·Court tlo Vacate Its

Judgment After Appeal and Reversal.

In Reyn.olds v. Harris, 14 California 668, the court
recognized a motion as being a proper remedy to vacate
a judgment reversed on appeal; the court stating:
''It is again said that the proper form of proceeding is by action in the usual form and not by
motion, hut the authorities seem to he the other
wa,y, and we see no reason why, in this class of
cases, there should he an exception to the usual
and recognized authority of the Courts to pre·
vent or to remedy an injurious and illegal execution of the process of its officers. (See the following cases in which this authority of the Court
has been upheld : 3 Johns, 'Ch. 474; 5 I d. 29 ;
~Iobile Cotton Press vs. Moor & Magee, 9 Port.
G79 ; 2 Yeates, 516; 1 Serg. & R. 2 Wend. 260; 7
Id. 88, 7 Gill & J. 512; 7 J. J. Marsh. 625.) * * *
"It is hard to see why a man buying in another's property sold under a judgment rendered
according to the forms of law, hut against the
principl'es of law, should obtain any advantage
from his own judgment thus improperly obtained.
"It is true that as the error was the error of
the Judge, he 'Should not lose by it, but it is not
so clear that he should make a profit by it. It is
equally clear that the defendant should not suffer
by any such improper judgment, if it can be
avoided in consistency with a due respect to the
rights of others. It would appear to be exact
equity to ·set aside acts whi~h have been illegally
done, if this can be without injury to third persons ; so that all ·parties whom the proceedings
affect stand in the same position after as before
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the acts so done. How could Raun insist that his
judgment, rendered against law, should be enforced, when the error can be corrected without
the slightest injury to him, and when he is reinstated to all the rights which he had before its
rendition¥
''Accordingly, the principle has been declared in cases innumerable, that when a judgment
is reversed, the defendant is to be restored to all
things which he has lost by the judgment. (See
Jones v. Harker, 5 Mass. 264; Cummings v. Noyes,
10 Ma!ss. 433.) In Jackson v. Cadwell (1 Cowen,
644), the Court say, the same reasons of policy
which secure to an innocent purchaser a valid title
do not exist when the judgment creditor becomes
purchaser, and it would be the height of injustice
to aUow the party guilty of fue irregularity to
take advantage of it. It is true, that in that case
the sale was set aside for error's in conducting it,
but the principle would apply to an erroneous
judgment, procured by the instrumentality of the
plaintiff or his ·attorney.
''So in the case of The Bank of the United
States v. The Bank of Washington {6· Pet. 19), it
is said : 'The reversal of the judgement gives a
new right or cause of action against the parties to
the judgment, and creates a legal ohligatinn on
their part to restore what the other party has lost
by reason of the erroneous judgment, and as between the parties to the judgment there is all the
privity necessary to sustain and enforce such
right.'
'' Authoritie:s might be multiplied indefinitely,
to the same effect, but it is unne<cessary. 'The current of authority, broken by only a case or two,
goes directly to the point, that a party obtaining
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through a judgment, before reversal, any advantage or benefit, must restore what he got to
the other party, after the reversal.''
The appellants having been successful in reversing
the judgment appealed from are entitled to complete
restitution. Restitution is not dependant upon statute,
and any statute such as Section 104-41-22 U.C.A. 1943 is
cumulative. This is so stated in Bancroft's Code P~actice
and Remedies, Yol. 9, Sec. 7449, p. 9802:
''The remedy of restitution requires restoration of property which one has lost on account of
the execution of an erroneous judgment, by the
party who has obtained it. A party to a cause who
has lost money or property under or by virtue of
a judgment which is afterwards reversed is entitled to res·titution, so as to be placed in statu
quo with respect to his rights and advantages
previous to the erroneous judgment. Such re'stitution is generally regarded as ·a matter of right,
and does not depend upon the merits of the controversy between the parties, the probabilities of
another judgment to the same effect, or the solvency of the party entitled thereof. 'The defendant
having been put out of possession by an abuse of
the proce'ss of the law, the law must he just to itself, as well as to the defendant, by restoring him
to that of which he was wrongfully deprived.
When the defendant is restored to the possession,
then, and not until then, will the court be in condition in which it can honorably to itself pass
upon the further rights of the parties'.''
The judgment appealed from, when re'\"ersHd, lacks
vitality for any purpos·e as pointed out in Larsen vs.
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Gasber'g, W anren vs. Robison and other authorities cited
above. It is a void judgment and once the remittitur is
filed its lack of vitality is shown upon an inspection of
the judgment-roll. An early California case characterizes
a void judgm'ent and which requires only an inspection of
the judgment roll to demonstrate its want of vitality as
"a dead limb upon the judicia1 tr~e, which should be
lopped off if the power so to do exists.'' The court has
inherent power to vacate such a judgment at any time
and regardless of the expiration of the term at which
the judgment was entered. This was the holding in the
cas·e of People v. Gree'YIJ,e et al., 16 Poo. 197, where the
California court stated:
"It is conceded by all of the authorities that
a court will interpose to stay the execution of a
void judgment. A judgment which is void upon
its face, and which requires only an inspection of
the judgment roll to demonstrate its want of
vitality, is a dead limb upon the judicial tree,
which should be lopped off if the power so to do
exists. It can bear no fruit to the plaintiff, but
is a constant menace to the defendant. It is said
a court whose process is abused ·by an attempt
to enforce a void judgment will interfere for its
own dignity, and for the protection of its officers,
to arrest further action. Mills v. Dickson, 6 Rich.
L·aw, 486. The most effectual method of doing
this i s by extirpating the judgment itself; by removing a form which is without substance. InNew
York, with a statute similar to section 473 of our
Code, the courts have held that the power to vacate a judgment is inherent and is not limited by
their Code, which only has reference to ordinary
1
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defaults, (Dinsmore v. Adams, 48 How. Pr. 274,)
and that the limitation does not apply to an unauthorized judgment, nor to a judgment entered
without service of process, (Simonson v. Blake,
20 How. Pr. 484.) See cases cited in Wharton v.
Harlan, supra. In this last case McKinstry, J.,
in commenting upon the ruie enunciated in Bell
v. Thompson, supra, said: 'This technical rule as
to action during the same term, never applied to
a pretended judgment, in fact void, and could
never have applied to statutory judgments entered
by the clerk, which may be entered in vacation'."
The Greene case, supra, reiterates the fundamental
principle that whenever possibl·e a court should eliminate
from its files and records anything of a redundant nature
and should, so to speak, clear out the dead timber so as
to leave of record only thos·e things that have vitality and
meaning. But here we have a situation that requires affirmative action in order to bring about complete restitution ·on the record. In a suit to quiet title, where real
property is involved, those things that affect the record
and constitute clouds on the title become and are the
controlling matters, and it is the record title that must
be restored and the clouds on the same ·expunged in order
to bring about comp'lete restitution. If the judgmHnt was
one for the payment of money and the money had been
collected upon execution issued on the judgment subsequently reversed, it would be the money that the losing
party on appeal would have to return to the successful
appellant. If the successful appellant had been removed
from possession by reason of the erroneous judgment,
then it would he the possession that would have to be reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stored. In Pioo v. Cwyas, 48 Cal. 639, the court held that
a motion address·ed to the trial court was proper to the
end that the moving party be re·stored to the pos'S'ession
of a hotel from which he had been dispossessed by reason
of a judgment subS"equently revers·ed. 'The report of the
case contains a succinct statement of counsel in support
of the motion as follows:
That a plaintiff must restore to his opponent any advantage he obtained through his
judgment, upon its reversal, is a very ancient
doctrine. (Jones v. Harker, 5 Mass. 264; Cummings v. Noyes, 10 Mass. 433; Jackson v. Cadwell,
1 Cowen, 644: Bank of United States v. Bank of
Washington, 6 Peters, 8.)
1

''

''The Supreme Court of California have indorsed the po sition in Reynolds v. Harris, 14 Cal.
667. They have sustained Reynolds v. Harris in
Polack v. Shafer, (46 Cal. 270.)"
1

The right to restitution is implied and is not dependent upon any direct order by the appeHate court
to that ef:fect. The right to make complete restitution is
inherent in the trial court, notwithstanding the exist·ence
of the same right in the reviewing court. To this effect
is 3 Amerioa;n Jurisprudence, p. 746, 8ec.1251:
''While reviewing courts have inherent
power, if they see proper, to direct that restitution be made, they rarely exercise that power; the
duty of taking and authorizing such steps as may
be necessary ·to enforce the rights of the appe'llan t arising from the reversal is usually confided
to the trial court whose judgment was reversed.
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It is ciear that that court has jurisdiction, while
the subject of the controversy and the parties are
before it, to enforce restitution of what a party
has lost by the enforcement of the judgment, and
it is its duty to do so. A statutory provi'sion
authorizing a reviewing court on reversa:l, to make
restitution of all property and rights lost by the
judgment reversed, does not preclude the court
below from exercising the same power. Nor are its
right and duty to enforce restitution dependent
upon any direct order for restitution by the appellate court. The right to such restitution is implied,
and in subsequent proceedings for its enforcement
it need not be shown that, by any mandate or express order, the reviewing court has directed that
restitution be made. Moreover, the fact that a
judgment was reversed for want of jurisdiction
does not prevent either the reviewing court or the
trial court from compelling restitution. The court
whose judgment or ~ecree is .nevers1ed and am'fi!Ulled, having by its own act occas~oned the wf"'ong,
possesses an inherent and summary jurisdiction
to afford tf1edress without ~refe,enc:e to the pe~culiar
nature of the controversy which it had erroneously
dete~rmined." (Italics ours)
Hayne New Trial ~and A~e1al, Vol. 2, Sec. 308, p.
1782, cites the Greene case, supra, and states that a void
judgment requiring no more than a mere inspection of
the judgment-roll to demonstrate its want of vitality
can be relieved against at any time, however remote, by
mere motion. The author states the rule in the fol~owing
language:
''But it i'S to be remembered that the provisions of section 473 do not apply to judgments
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which are void upon their face, and which require no more than a mere inspection of the
judgment-roll to demonstrate their want of vitality. It has been said that such judgments are dead
limbs upon the judicial tree, which should be
lopped off, if the power so to do can he exercised.
They hear no fruit for the plaintiff, and are a
constant menace to the defendant. If the default
judgment is void on it's face, therefore, and its
defects apparent on the judgment-roll, there is
no time limit within which they are required to be
presented as a ground for the relief contemplated
by this section. It may be relieved against at any
time, however remote, by mere motion. 'The attention of the courts need merely to be called to
that which its own record demonstrates, and the
judgment, order, or proce-eding will he nullified
without question.''
This court in Ma;ds,en v. M~adsen, 78 Utah 84, 1 Pac.
2d 946, holds that when the judgment of the trial court
has been vacated on appeal ''it can only mean that the
judgment is set aside, vacated, and annulled, and, having been thus swept from existence, the lower court has
no power to breathe into any part of it the breath of
life.'' The court quotes with approval from other authorities to the ef:Dect that the trial court, after a judgment
has been reversed, should put the litigants hack where
they were when the initial mistake was committed, and to
that ~end should retrace its stetps, if necessary, the court
quoting from the Nebraska court as foll:ows:
'' 'When the judgment of a trial court has
been reversed in an error proceeding, the court
should retrace its steps to the· point where the
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first material error occurred. It should prut the
litigants back where they were when the initial
mistake was committed.' Missouri, K. & T. Trust
Co. v. Clark, 60 Neb. 406, 83 N. W. 202, 203."
To the same effect is Hathatway v. McOonk;i;e, 85
Utah 21, 38 Pac. 2d 300:
'' • • • The law is wen ·established that, upon
the reversal of a judgment hecause of lack of
jurisdiction, the court directing the reversal retains jurisdiction of the parties and the subdectmatter for the purpose of placing the parties in
the same position that they were in before the
judgment so rendered was entered. The law in
such case is thus stated hy the 8uprem.e Court of
the United States in the case of Northwestern
Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U. S. 216, 11 8. Ct. 523,
524, 35 L. Ed. 1'51 :
'But here the jurisdiction exercised by the
court below was only to correct by its own order
that which, according to the judgment of its appellate court, it had no authority to do in the first
instance; and the 1power is inherent in every court,
whilst the subject of controversy is in its custody,
and the parties are before it, to undo what it had
no authority to do originally, and in which it,
therefore, acted erroneously, apd to restore, so
far as pos'sible, the parties to their former position. Jurisdiction to correct What had been wrongfully done must remain with the court so long as
the parties and the case are properly before it,
either in the first instance or when remanded to
it by an appellate tribunal.***
'We are of opinion that the proceeding to enoree the restitution in the cases mentioned is under
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the control of the court, and that ·ali needed inquiry can be had to guide its judgment in a summary proceeding, upon motion of the partie's; the
only requisite being that the opposite party shall
be heard, so that in directing restitution no further wrong be committed. The restitution is not
made to depend at all upon the question whether
or not the court rendering the judgment reversed
acted within or without its jurisdiction.'
''Other cases where the same doctrine is announced are 'Texas L. & Irr. Co. v. Sanders et al.,
101 Tex. 616, 111 S. W. 648; Lipp v. Hunt, 29
Neb. 256, <t5 N. W. 685; Polack v. Shafer, 46 Cal.
270; Pico v. Cuyas, 48 Cal. 639; Paul v. Armstrong, 1 Nev. at page 82.'' * * *

'' * * * To hold that a court may either grant
or refuse restitution of property as suits its fancy
without being advised as to the merits of the controversy would be to substitute caprice for rules
of law. The petitioners were as a matter of law
entitled to he restored to the possession of the
property in question upon the dismissal of the
action for want of jurisdiction.
''Defendants further contend that mandamus
is not the proper remedy to review a matter such
as that here presented. The que'stion thus presented is not free from difficulty. It is well established that a writ of mandamus may be used
to compel an inferior tribunal to act on a matter
within its jurisdiction but not to control its discretion while acting nor to reverse its judgm·ent
when made. On the other hand, where a judgment
is entered, it ·becomes the duty of the court to
· enforce such judgment, and, in case of its refusal,
the party aggrieved may by mandamus compel
its enorcement. There is no discretion in a court
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as to whether it will or will not enforce its. judgment. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, 48 Utah,
214, 159 P. 541." • • •
• • • ''In order that petitioners may reap the
full fruits of the reversal of the city court judgment it is necessary that an order of re-restitution issue placing them as near as may be in the
same position that they were in before the void
judgment was rendered. To deny petitioners a
writ of re-restitution is to deny them rights.which
for the present are fixed and determined by the
order dismissing the action. In substance, if not
in form, the refusal of the court below to grant
petitioners re-restitution of the premises in dispute was to deny them the right to enforce their
judgment. In such case the right of petitioners to
a writ of restitution may be enforced by a 'Proceeding in mandamus. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, supra.''
Again bearing in mind that the judgment appealed
from in the Meagher case affected the title to real property and impos·ed costs upon the defendants, who were
succes·sful in their appeal, the mel"e suggestion of a possibility that title might be ~louded by the erroneous and
void judgment should require the formal vacation and
setting aside thereof. The authorities above stated
demonstrate the requirement of full and compJete restitution and that a motion to vacate and set aside is an
appropriate remedy. The respondent trial judge recognized the appropriateness of the motion when he ordered
the void judgment vacated as against Joe T. Juhan and
Ashley Valley Oil 'Company. In failing to act upon the
motion of Ray Phebus he misconstrued the mandate of
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this court, and to correct that situation mandamus is an
aprptropriate proceeding.
3. This Oourt 'Can Construe its Opinion on Application tior Writ of Mandamus.

'This court in W a:rren vs.

Rob~son,

supra, held:

''And, where an appeal is taken from a judgment of an inferior court entered under a mandate of the appellant court, the latter tribunal
will construe its own mandate in connection with
its opinion to determine whether the inferior court
proceeded in accordance therewith.'' Gaines v.
Rugg, 148 U. S. 228, 13 Sup. Ct. 611, 37 L. Ed.
432; In re Sanford Ford & Tool Co., supra.
In Whitney v. Whitney, 181 Pac. 2d 245 (Okl.), tlm
same rule was announced:
''In State ex rei. First Nat. Bank vs. Ogden,
Judge, 173 Okl. 285, 49 P. 2d '565, 566, the rule
stated in State ex rei Devonian Oil Co. v. Smith,
Judge, 138 Okl. 89, 280 P. 433, was relied upon
in holding:
'It is the province of this court to construe its
own mandate in connection with its opinion, and,
if it finds that the trial court has misconstrued
the same, the mistake may he corrected by writ of
mandamus from this court'."
The return or answer to the petition on file herein
s·tates no fact in justification for failing to set aside the
judgment suooessfu1ly appealed fl"om as- against Ray
Phebus. The respondent judge in ,effect says that he
was under no obligation to vacate the judgment as against
Phebus, even though he did so as against Juhan and
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Ashley Valley Oil Company. In this, and if that be the
contention of the respondent judge, he has attempted
to construe the decision of this court which, so far as. the
motion to vacate was concerned, was not his prerogative. The general rule is well stated in American Jurisprudence, ·yol. 3, Sec. 1237, p. 733:
''After the reviewing court has determined
a case before it and remanded such case to the
lower court, the latter is without power to modify,
alter, amend, set aside, or in any manner disturb
or depart from the judgment of the reviewing
court, even during the continuance of the term
in which it was rendered. The judgment of the
higher court is not reviewable in -any way by the
court below, in the exercise of its equitable powers,
or otherwise. The lower court cannot vary or examine the decree of the higher court for any other
purpose than execution, give any other or further
relief; review it, even for apparent error, upon any
matter decided on appeal; or intermeddle with it,
further than to settle so much as has been remanded. It can only proceed to execute the mandate and settle so much as remains to be done,
without rescission or modification.
"If the lower courts were authorized to disobey the mandate, litigation would never be ended
and the supreme tribunal of the state would be
shorn of that authority over the inferior tribunal
with which it is invested. But the rule has long
prevailed that there must he an end to the 'litigation of a particular cause, and that an alleged injured litigant, in order to establish what he may
deem the justice of the cause, may not have, de
novo, trial after trial, ad infinitum. * * * ''
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Also AmeriCium Jurisprudenoe, Vol. 3, Sec. 1229,
p. 726:

'' * * * The mandate of the reviewing court,
or, as it is called in some jurisdictions, the 'remittitur' or 'Procedendo,' these terms being used
synonymously in this sense, remitting the case
to the lower court is the official mode of communicating its judgment to the inferior tribunal the
judgment of which has been reviewed. By this
means, the lower court is advised of the judgment
or decision of the reviewing court reversing, affirming, or modifying the judgment of the lower
court, and is directed to enforce, or reverse and
set aside, the judgment, as the case may be.''
Als·o Ametricarn Jurispruaence, Vol. 3, Sec. 1234, pp.
730-731:
''After a case has been determined by the
reviewing court, the duty of the latter is to comply
with the mandate of the former. The mandate of
the reviewing court is binding on the lower court
and must be strictly followed and carried into
effect according to its true intent and meaning, as
determined hy the directions given by such reviewing court. Public interest requires that litigation shall come t<;> an end speedily, so that when
a cause has been tried to judgment, and the merits
of the trial determined upon appeal, the trial
court, upon remittitur, has no power but to obey
the judgment of the appellate court. * * *"
This court, in its decision, in the Meagher case on
appeal clearly ·states the admitted fact that Ray Phebus
was one of the appellants. The language of reversal, with
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costs to the appellants, is clear and unequivoca:l. Beyond
that the trial court, in view of the authorities stated
above, can go no further except that in a subsequent
appropriate proceeding the decision of this court must
be looked to to determine the law of the cas·e and its
applicability to subsequent proceedings. As to the mandate, however, and the reversal of the judgment appealed
from as to all of the appealing defendants th~ere can be
no question. In view of the answer filed herein, with all
of the facts admitted, the reversal by this court does not
distinguish as between the petitioner Phebus and the
petitioners Joe T. Juhan and Ashley V a11ey Oil Company. By ruling upon the motion, granting it as to Juhan
and Ashley Valley Oil Company and excluding Ray
Phebus therefrom, the respondent judge acted contrary
to the mandate of this court.
4. Mandamus is a Proper Remedy.

When the trial judge fails or refuses to give effect
to the remittitur, or misconstrues it, or acts beyond its
province in carrying it out, it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to ·enforce compHance by writ of mandamus. This court in Ketch!um Coal Co. v. Christensen,
48 Utah 214, 159 Pac. 541, so held:
''Broadly speaking, superior courts never
control nor attempt to direct inferior courts or
tribunals before judgment while acting merely
judicia1ly or in matters of discretion. After judgment, however, when the inferior court or tribunal
has exhausted its discretionary powers, the
superior court will compel the enforcement of
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judgments, regardless of the nature or character
of the proceeding. Before an action has proceeded
to judgment there ordinarily are ample statutory
remedies provided for the correction of errors of
judgment and for an abuse of discretion. No such
remedies are, however, necessary after judgment,
since, when that point is reached, judicial discretion ends and it then beeomes the duty of the
courts to enforce their judgments, and if they refuse or neg1:ect to do so mandamus will lie to
compel them to discharge the duty, which is one
imposed by law. Any other course would compel
men, in vindicating their legal rights, to have recourse to the primitive methods of app~ying brute
force. Courts are instituted to prevent recourse to
such methods. But if courts can successfully refuse to do their duty they merely invite men to
have reeourse to such methods.''
In the recent case of Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, - Utah -, 191 Pac. 2d 153, (Pac. Adv.
Sheets, Apr. 23, 1948) this court stated:
"'The rule in this state, and in most other
jurisdictions, is that resort to mandamus may
be had to compel an inferior court to comply with
the mandate of a superior court. The rule was well
stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Ephraim Hanson in the case of Utah Copper Co. v. District
Court, 91 Utah 377, 64 P. 2d 241, 250: 'The rule
is well established and there does not seem to
be anything to the contrary that when a case has
been determined by a reviewing court and remanded to the trial court, the duty of the latter is
to comply with the mandate of the former. The
mandate is binding on the lower court and must
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ing to its true intent and meaning as determined
by the directions given by the reviewing court.
"\Yhen the trial court fails or refuses to obey or
give effect to the mandate or remittitur, or misconstrues it or acts beyond its province in carrying it out, it becomes the province and duty of the
appellate court to enforce compliance therewith,
and it is generally recognized that such may he
done on writ or order of mandamus. The lower
court upon remand of a case from a higher court,
must obey the mandate or remittitur and render
judgment in conformity thereto and has no authority to enter any judgment not in conformity with
the order. Whatever comes before and is decided
and disposed of by the reviewing court is considered as finally settled and the inferior court
to which a mandate issues is bound by the decree
as the law of the case and must carry it into execution according to the mandate, and after the reviewing court has determined the case befor·e it
and remanded it to the lower court, the latter is
without power to modify, alter, amend, set aside,
or in any manner disturb or depart from the
judgment of the reviewing court; that the judgment of the higher court is not reviewable in any
way by the court below and the low·er court cannot vary or examine the decree of the higher court
for any other purpose than execution, or give any
other or further relief or review it even for apparent error upon any matter. decided on app~al,
or meddle with it further than to settle so much
as has been .remanded'.''
It may .be that the respondents, by thieir answer
denying any duty to set the judgment aside as to the
petitioner, Ray Phebus, are relying upon an obvious mistake in language used by this court in the M·eagher deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mswn. At one place in the decision it is stated: ''On
January 19, 1945, Phebus quit daimed his interest to
Juhan.'' This is a correct statement. At another place
it is stated: ''Phebus apparently has conveyed what interest he has to Meagher.'' That statement is incorrect.
In the record before this court on ruppeal and before the
trial court, there was no conveyance from Phebus to
Meagher. This court, however, did not determine any
question of title and exp~essly stated that the relinquishment of possible claims does "not, however, affect the
issues as submitted to us.'' The fact remains that Phebus
was a moving party in the appeal to this court against
whom a judgment had been entered determining title,
awarding costs and enjoining him from asserting any
claim or title on his part or those claiming under him.
'This judgment, in its entirety, was reversed and the trial
judge now refuses to give full effect to remittitur. 'The
trial judge ho'1ds that the judgment was not reversed
as to Phebus and, therefore, the necessity of this proceeding.
5.

Juhan and

Ashley VaHey Oil Company Are

Adversely Affected.

This court in its decision in the Meagher case states:
''Briefly the above sets out the chain of title of the
various parties concerned, leaving as inte~ested parties
in the proceedings, plaintiff Meagher, and defendants
Ashley Valley Oil Company and Juhan. Phehus apparently has conveyed what interest he has to Meagher. It
may be that some of these transfers and assignments,
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which so far as the abstract is concerned appear inconsistent, are in fact merely efforts to clear title by relinquishment of possible claims. They do not, however,
affect the issues as submitted to us.''
The Meagher action was commenced on D·ecember
5th, 1944. Phebus quitclaimed to Juhan under date of
January 19, 1945, during 1Jhe pendency of the aCJtion.
Juhan, in part, claims by, through and under Phebus.
If the original judgment is permited to stand, then Juhan
is out of the picture to the ·extent of the interest quitclaimed to him by Phebus and, regardless of the intention, the language used by this court and the issues raised
by the pleadings and at the trial, a question of title will
have been determined. Juhan has a real and substantial
interest in requiring the trial judge to s~et aside and
vacate the judgment heretofore entered against the Petitioner, Phebus, one of the successful appellants from
that judgment. By the denial of the motion to set aside
and vacate the judgment, the respondents herein are
circumventing the mandate and decision of this court.
CON'CLUSION

The reSipOndent judge, having acted in part upon
the motion to vacate the erroneous judgment, should
now be required by the order of this court to clarify the
record as to the Petitioner, Phebus. 'To do otherwise
would be to permit the respondent Meagher to gain an
advantage not contemplat~ed by the issues raised and
would result in his being able to turn to his advantage a
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void judgment. The trial judge, having presumed to act
upon the motion to vacate, should now be required to
grant the motion in its entirety and, to that end, an unqualified writ of mandamus or order should issue from
this court.
Respectfully submitted,
GUSTIN and RICHARDS
Attorneys for Ray Phebus
and Joe T. Juhan
INGEBRETSEN, RAY,
RAWLINS & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Ash~ey Valley
Oil Company
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